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Abstract. In this paper, we formally verify security properties of the
ARMv7 Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) for user mode executions.
To obtain guarantees that arbitrary (and unknown) user processes are
able to run isolated from privileged software and other user processes,
instruction level noninterference and integrity properties are provided,
along with proofs that transitions to privileged modes can only occur
in a controlled manner. This work establishes a main requirement for
operating system and hypervisor verification, as demonstrated for the
PROSPER separation kernel. The proof is performed in the HOL4 theo-
rem prover, taking the Cambridge model of ARM as basis. To this end, a
proof tool has been developed, which assists the verification of relational
state predicates semi-automatically.
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1 Introduction
The ability to execute application software in a manner which is isolated from
other application software running on a shared processing platform is an essential
prerequisite for security. This allows user applications or virtual machines to
coexist without violating confidentiality or integrity of critical data, it allows
critical system resources to be protected from user manipulation, it can help to
prevent fault propagation, and it can be used to save costly hardware that might
otherwise be needed to provide physical separation.
Isolation is typically provided by a mix of hardware and software. A memory
management unit (MMU) may be used to provide basic memory protection, and
the processor may be equipped with multiple privilege levels, running application
programs as userland processes and kernel routines at privileged levels, with
additional abilities to access and configure critical parts of the processor, the
MMU, and various storage/display/peripheral devices attached to the processor.
In such a setting, isolation is a result of the correct interplay between hard-
ware and kernel. It is the responsibility of the kernel to correctly manipulate
the processor state to achieve the desired effects, whatever they may be (con-
text switching, logging, fault management, device management, etc). It is the
responsibility of the processing hardware to correctly implement the partitioning
safeguards and mode transition conventions assumed by the kernel. For security,
the kernel and the processor must both be correct and agree on their mode of
interaction. Most formal kernel analyses in the literature [7,12,13,15,18] address
the kernel software itself, in source or binary form, and leave the properties of
the instruction set architecture (ISA) to be handled by fiat. Our contribution is
to suggest a possible approach, including tool support, for performing the ISA
specific security analysis, specifically for user mode execution.
We have identified two main concerns.
First, an implicit contract must exist which stipulates the region of influ-
ence/dependency of userland processes. That is, in a given user mode proces-
sor/MMU configuration it must be determined which memory locations and
(control) registers can be read or written, or, in a more fine grained analysis,
how information is able to flow to or from specific parts of the processor and
the memory. User processes must be constrained in accessing or otherwise being
influenced by critical resources of the kernel or of other user processes. This is
not trivial. For instance, as shown by Duflot et al. [9], on some x86 processors it
is possible for low-privilege code to overwrite higher privilege code by writing to
an address that usually refers to the video card. To enable this attack, it suffices
to first flip a configuration bit usually accessible from the low privilege level.
Second, kernel code relies on a set of mode switching conventions, for instance
on ARM that program status registers and relevant user registers (including the
program counter) are properly banked, the program counter is updated to point
at the correct location in the vector table, and so on. If these conventions are not
established by the processor and adhered to by the kernel, it may be possible for
userland processes to induce various sorts of malicious behavior, for instance by
letting a handler's link register point to a foreign address.
Performing this analysis is not trivial, particularly not if information flow
is to be taken into account, as is done in this paper. All instructions, error
conditions, and user to privileged mode transitions must be considered. The
number of instructions is high and in modern processors a single instruction can
involve a large number (order of 20-30) of atomic register or memory accesses.
In this paper, we identify and prove several partitioning-related properties
of the ARMv7 ISA specification [2,3] addressing user mode execution and mode
switching. The first is an instruction level noninterference property related to the
non-infiltration property in [12] stating that the behavior of an ARMv7 proces-
sor in user mode only depends on its accessible resources, mostly user registers,
MMU configurations and the memory allocated to that process. The second,
corresponding to the non-exfiltration property of [12], is an integrity property
stating that, again while in user mode, the processor is unable to modify pro-
tected resources. A third set of properties concerns mode switching conventions.
These properties have been applied in the PROSPER project [5] to verify iso-
lation for the PROSPER separation kernel [8]. The PROSPER project aims at
producing and verifying a fully functional secure hypervisor for embedded sys-
tems, providing services such as guest isolation, so that only explicitly allowed
communication occurs.
Our proof uses the HOL4 [4] model of ARM, developed at Cambridge by Fox
et al. [10]. We extend this model by simple memory protection. The ARMv7 ISA
properties outlined above are formalized and proved. To make the quite sizable
proof task feasible, we have developed a helper tool based on relational Hoare
logic, that is able to automate significant parts of the proof.
To the best of our knowledge our work represents the first formalized analysis
of the ARMv7 ISA. Others, specifically the Cambridge HOL4 group, have de-
veloped various helper tools for assembling, disassembling, executing, and man-
aging ARM machine code and the HOL4 ARM ISA model [10,16]. Also, the
HOL4 ARM model has been used in several verification exercises in the liter-
ature, on software fault isolation (SFI) [22] and on the extension of the seL4
verification work [13] from C to binary level [20]. However, we have not yet seen
general correctness properties formalized and verified for ARM at the ISA level.
In fact, we believe the type of analysis presented here can be useful beyond
kernel verification. For instance, formalized security properties can be useful to
both improve the usefulness and precision of ISA specifications, and to enable
developers obtain a concise description of secure configurations, without manual
consideration of extensive architecture specifications.
2 The Formal Specification of ARM
We use Fox et al's monadic HOL4 model [10] of the ARMv7 ISA. This model
covers the ARM, Thumb and ThumbEE instruction sets, comprising 81 instruc-
tions for branching, memory access, data processing, co-processor access, status
access, and miscellaneous functionality. Figure 1 shows a simplified definition of
an ARM state in this model. The function psrs returns the value of a processor
state register (of type ARMpsr). The processor state registers include the current
program status register, CPSR, in addition to the banked psrs SPSR_m for each
privileged mode m, except for system mode. Program status registers encode
arithmetic flags, the processor mode M, interrupt masks (I for ordinary and F
for fast interrupts) and instruction encoding. The ARMv7 core provides seven
processor modes: one non-privileged user mode usr, and six privileged modes
(abt,fiq,irq,svc,und,sys), activated when an exception (such as an inter-
rupt) is invoked. Variants with the TrustZone extension [1] also have a monitor
arm-state = <| psrs : PSRName -> ARMpsr;
regs : RName -> word32;
memory : word32 -> word8;
coproc : coprocessors;
accesses : memory_access list;
misc : Monitors # ARMinfo # bool # bool |>;
Fig. 1. The ARM state in HOL4
mode. However, this has to be invoked from a privileged mode and we consider
its usage out of scope of this paper.
The function regs takes a register name and returns its value. The ARM reg-
isters include sixteen general purpose registers (r0-r15) that are available from
all modes in addition to the banked registers of each privileged mode (except
of sys) that are available only in that mode. Among the user registers, register
r13 functions as stack pointer SP, register r14 as link register LR and register
r15 as program counter PC.
The function memory reads a byte (word8) from an address (word32). The
field coproc represents those coprocessor registers in CP14 and CP15 that im-
plicitly influence execution. The coprocessor registers central for this work are
registers SCTLR , TTBR0 and DACR of coprocessor 15. They, together with the page
table, are used to configure the MMU. The field misc represents the exclusive
monitors used for synchronization purposes, general information about the state,
e.g. the architecture version, if the system is waiting for an interrupt etc, and
accesses records the accesses to the memory.
A computation in the monadic HOL4 ARM model is a term of the following
(slightly beautified) type
α M = arm_state 7→ (α, arm_state) error_option.
where error_option is a datatype defined as follows:
(α,β) error_option = ValueState of α => β
| Error of string
Computations act on a state arm_state and return either ValueState a s, a
new state s of type arm_state along with a return value a of type α, or an error
e. The unpredictable computations, i.e., those that are underspecified by the
ARM specification return an error. The monad unit constT injects a value into
a computation, i.e. constT a s = ValueState a s, while binding is a sequential
composition operation
f1 =e f2 = λs.case f1s of Error c → Error c
|| ValueState a s′ →
if e s′ then f2 a s
′
else f1 s.
That is, if e holds in the final state of f1, the return value of f1 is passed to f2
as the input parameter, otherwise f2 is not executed.
errorT a = Error a
condT e f = if e then f else constT ()
if e then f1 elsef2 = λs.if e s then f1 s else f2 s
f1 |||e f2 = f1 =e (λx.f2 =e (λy.constT (x, y)))
forTe l h f = if l > h then constT []
else ((f l)=e (λr.forTe (l + 1) h f =e (λl.constT r :: l)))
Fig. 2. Auxiliary monad operations
In addition to unit and binding, the ARM monadic specification uses stan-
dard constructs for lambda, let, and cases, as well as the monad operations
parallel composition (f1 |||e f2), positive conditional (condT e f), full condi-
tional (if e then f1 else f2), error (errorT a), and an iterator (forTe l h f),
(inductively) defined in Figure 2.
3 Memory Management
The Memory Management Unit (MMU) enforces memory access policies and is
therefore important for isolation. MMU configurations consist of page tables in
memory and dedicated registers of CP15. Specific to ARM is the possibility of
partitioning pages into collections of memory regions, so-called domains. The
theorems in this paper are based on the concrete MMU configurations (memory
ranges, the page table setup etc.) used in the PROSPER kernel. The coprocessor
registers involved are SCTLR, TTBR0 and DACR. The SCTLR register determines
whether the MMU is enabled, TTBR0 contains the base address of the page table,
and DACR manages the ARM domains.
MMU Extension The evaluation function permitted takes as parameters a byte
address, a flag indicating whether reading or writing access is to be evaluated,
the values of SCTLR, TTBR0 and DACR, a flag indicating whether permissions are
to be checked against a privileged mode, and the memory containing the page
tables. The pair of booleans returned by permitted states whether the access
permission on the specified byte is defined in the given configuration and the
outcome of that decision (true if access is granted). The PROSPER kernel uses
a basic version of permitted, supporting one-level page tables without address
translation, but including the interpretation of ARM domains. It is shown that
permitted is defined for all addresses in all reachable states.
The history of memory accesses is tracked in the accesses field of the ma-
chine state, allowing to compute the set of memory pages accessed by an in-
struction. To stop computation after the first access violation, =nav has been
chosen as standard binding operator, where nav s (no access violation) is true
if and only if there is no entry in the access list of machine state s that causes
permitted to return a negative answer int the current configuration of s. The
recording of an access always happens before the access itself.
next irpt s =
(clear_alist =nav




(λ(opc, ins). is_viol =T (λav. clear_alist =nav
(λu. if av then prefetch_abort
else




else take_exception irpt =nav (λu. clear_wait_for_irpt))) s
Fig. 3. The next computation.
The instruction execution function next (see Figure 3) takes an exception/in-
terrupt flag irpt and a state s and produces the consequent state, by either initi-
ating the demanded exception or by fetching and executing the next instruction
pointed to by the PC in s. If an access violation is recorded after instruction
fetching or execution, a prefetch or data abort exception (respectively) is initi-
ated. The access list is cleared between the single steps, preventing the execution
from halting and instead proceeding with exception handling. Occasionally, the
unconditional binding =T is used.
MMU Configuration Let accessible i a express that address a is readable
and writable by user process i. The predicate mmu_setup i s holds if and only
if (i) state s implements the desired access policy for process i, (ii) no MMU
configuration for any address is underspecified, and (iii) none of the active page
tables in s (represented by the address set page_table_adds s) is accessible
according to the policy.
mmu_setup i s = ∀add, is_write, u, p.
(u,p) = permitted add is_write (mmu_registers s) F s.memory
⇒ u ∧ ((accessible a i) ⇔ p)
∧ (a ∈ (page_table_adds s) ⇒ ¬(accessible a i))
4 Security Properties
We next turn to formalizing the instruction level partitioning properties. For
user mode execution we formulate the requirements in terms of non-infiltration
and non-exfiltration properties (cf. [12]), adapted to our setting.
Our model does not include caches, timing or hardware extensions such as
TrustZone or virtualization support. Devices are not part of the model either;
however, interrupts and other exceptions are taken into account, apart from fast
interrupts and resets. Accordingly, the fiq and mon modes are outside of our
analysis. As discussed, the chosen memory configuration is specific to the PROS-
PER project. Consequences of a limited coprocessor model and underspecified
instructions are discussed in Section 8.
4.1 Non-infiltration
Confidentiality of the kernel and neighboring user processes is guaranteed by non-
infiltration, a noninterference-like property at the user mode single instruction
level. Consider two machine states in user mode that are low equivalent in the
sense that the two states agree on the resources (registers and memory locations)
that are permitted to influence user mode execution, but do not necessarily agree
on other resources. Non-infiltration holds if the poststates, after execution of one
instruction, remain low equivalent (or produce the same error).
Theorem 1. Non-infiltration
∀s1, s2, i, irpt. mode s1 = mode s2 = usr ∧ bisim i s1 s2
⇒ (∃t1, t2. next irpt s1 = ValueState () t1
∧ next irpt s2 = ValueState () t2 ∧ bisim i t1 t2)
∨ (∃e. next irpt s1 = Error e ∧ next irpt s2 = Error e)
The relation bisim is the low equivalence relation. User mode processes are
allowed to be influenced by the user mode registers, the memory assigned to
them, the CPSR, the coprocessors, pending access violations and the misc state
component. Exclusive monitors (as field of misc) can inherently influence and
be influenced by user mode software and need thus to be cleared by kernels on
context switches.
bisim i s1 s2 =
mmu_setup i s1 ∧ mmu_setup i s2 ∧ (equal_user_regs s1 s2)
∧ (∀a. (accessible i a) ⇒ (s1.memory a = s2.memory a))
∧ (s1.psrs(CPSR)= s2.psrs(CPSR)) ∧ (s1.coproc.state = s2.coproc.state)
∧ (nav s1 = nav s2) ∧ (s1.misc = s2.misc)
∧ s1.psrs(spsr_(mode s1)) = s2.psrs(spsr_(mode s2))
∧ s1.regs(lr_(mode s1)) = s2.regs(lr_(mode s2))
The two last items have been included to assure that SPSR and link register
(of a possibly privileged poststate) only depend on resources allowed to influence
user mode execution as well, so that they can actually be restored later on.
4.2 Non-exfiltration
Non-exfiltration guarantees the integrity of resources foreign to the active user
process. It expresses that, given an MMU setup for user process i active, the
execution of a single instruction in user mode will not modify any other resources
but those considered to be modifiable by i.
Theorem 2. Non-exfiltration
∀s, t, i, irpt. mode s = usr ∧ mmu_setup i s
∧ next irpt s = ValueState () t ⇒ unmodified i s t
Here, unmodified expresses the desired relation between the prestate s and the
poststate t of an active process i. We require that coprocessors, the fast interrupt
flag and any memory not belonging to i remain unchanged. The only registers
allowed to change are the CPSR, the user mode registers, and the PSR and the
link register of the mode in t. The interrupt flag of the CPSR is not modified
when staying in user mode.
unmodified i s t =
(s.coproc = t.coproc) ∧ (s.psrs(CPSR).F = t.psrs(CPSR).F)
∧ (∀a. ¬(accessible i a) ⇒ (s.memory a = t.memory a))
∧ ((mode s ∈ {usr, mode t} ∧ mode t ∈ {usr, fiq, irq, svc, abt, und})
⇒( (∀reg. reg /∈ accessible_regs(mode t) ⇒ s.regs(reg) = t.regs(reg))
∧ (∀psr. psr /∈ {CPSR, spsr_(mode t)} ⇒ s.psrs(psr) = t.psrs(psr))
∧ (mode t = usr ⇒((s.psrs(CPSR)).I = (t.psrs(CPSR)).I))))
4.3 Switching to Privileged Modes
Secure user mode execution is not by itself sufficient. It is also necessary to con-
sider transitions to privileged modes to prevent user processes from privileged
execution rights. No user process should be able to effect a mode change with the
PC set to a memory location of his choice. Instead, all entry points into privileged
modes should be in the exception vector table. Similarly, even though user pro-
cesses are allowed to choose a different endianness for their own execution, that
should not influence the interpretation of the system handlers when switching
back to privileged mode. Theorem 3 covers those additional constraints.
Theorem 3. Privileged Constraints
∀s, t, i, irpt. mode s = usr ∧ mmu_setup i s
∧ next irpt s = ValueState () t ⇒ priv_const s t
Besides the above properties, the relation priv_const lists the reachable pro-
cessor modes3 and assures that interrupts are masked when entering a privileged
mode. Also, status register flags regarded as unwritable will be copied from the
CPSR in prestate s to the SPSR in poststate t. This guarantees that a kernel can
restore the saved program status register without further modifications when
jumping back to the user process. Otherwise, user processes would be able to
make the kernel enable/disable interrupts or change their execution mode. All
access violations, if there were any, will have been handled (nav t).
3 Monitor and system mode can only be reached from another privileged mode.
priv_const s t =
mode t ∈ {usr, fiq, irq, svc, abt, und}
∧ (mode t 6= usr ⇒
( t.regs(PC) ∈ vt_adds(vt_base s, mode t) ∧ nav t
∧ (t.psrs(CPSR)).(I, J, IT, E) = (T, F, 0w, endianess s)
∧ (t.psrs(spsr_(mode t))).(M, I, F)
= (usr, (s.psrs(CPSR)).I, (s.psrs(CPSR)).F)))
4.4 Link Register Contents in Supervisor Mode
Upon reception of a software interrupt, exception handlers in the invoked su-
pervisor mode (svc) often need to analyze the calling instruction, in order to
determine the software interrupt number for example. Therefore, verification
might require assertions that the memory location pointed to by the link regis-
ter actually does belong to the user process which caused the switch to supervisor
mode. Formally, when going from state s in user mode to state t in supervisor
mode, it is required that the svc-link register of t (i) is equal to the PC of s plus
an instruction set dependent offset and (ii) corrected by the offset, points to an
aligned word that is readable in t (independent of the mode). Note that offset
and width of the word depend on the instruction set used by the user process,
not on the one used by the handler.
Theorem 4. Link Register Constraints
∀s, t, i, irpt, lr. mode s = usr ∧ mmu_setup i s
∧ next irpt s = ValueState () t ∧ mode t = svc ∧ lr = t.regs(LR_svc)
⇒ lr = s.regs(PC) + offset s
∧ ((t.psrs(SPSR_svc)).T ⇒ aligned_word_readable t T (lr - 2w))
∧ (¬(t.psrs(SPSR_svc)).T ∧ ¬(t.psrs(SPSR_svc)).J
⇒ aligned_word_readable t F (lr - 4w))
Here, aligned_word_readable s b add states that the aligned word re-
ferred to by add is readable in s. Dependent on whether b is true or false,
word width and alignment are 16 or 32 bit.
4.5 Safe User Mode Execution
The final aim is to guarantee that as long as the machine is executing in
user mode, it causes no noninterference or integrity violations. Let s1  sn de-
note a sequence of next computations s1 → s2 → ....→ sn in user mode, i.e.
mode si = usr, 1 ≤ i < n and mode sn 6= usr. The following theorem assures the
safe execution and safe mode switching of a user process.
Theorem 5. Let s1  sn and mmu_setup i s1, (i) if s′1  s′n and bisim i s1 s′1 then
bisim i sn s
′
n, (ii) unmodified i s1 sn, and (iii) priv_const sn−1 sn.
The proof of (i) and (ii) is an easy induction on n using theorems 1 and 2.
Item (iii) follows from Theorem 3.
errorTR {errorT a : R_m→ R_m} constTR {constT a : R_m→ R_m}
condTR
{f : R_m→ R_m}
{condT ψ f : R_m→ R_m} forTR
{f : R_m→ R_m}
{forTnav l h f : R_m→ R_m}
conR
{f : R_m→ R_n} {f ′ : R_m→ R_n}
{if ψ then f else f ′ : R_m→ R_n}
widenR
{f : R_m→ R_n}
{f : R_m→ R_(n,k)} absR
∀y.{f y : R_m→ R_n}
{λy.f : R_m→ R_n}
seqTR
{f : R_m→ R_n} {f ′ : R_n→ R_k} (m = n) ∨ (n = k)
{f =nav f ′ : R_m→ R_(n,k)}
parTR
{f : R_m→ R_n} {f ′ : R_n→ R_k} (m = n) ∨ (n = k)
{f |||navf ′ : R_m→ R_(n,k)}
Fig. 4. Relational inference rules
5 The Logic Framework
Considering the size and complexity of the ARM model and the instruction set,
to prove the properties of the previous section tool support is essential. In this
section we present proof rules for relational and invariant reasoning that help to
automate the proof.
Non-infiltration The proof uses a relational Hoare logic based on assertions {f:R
→R'} defined as follows:
{f:R → R'} = ∀s1,s2. R s1 s2 ⇒
(∃a,t1,t2. f s1 = ValueState a t1 ∧
f s2 = ValueState a t2 ∧ R' t1 t2)
∨(∃e.f s1 = Error e ∧ f s2 = Error e)
The judgment asserts that, if started in prestates s1, s2 related by prerelation
R, either the executions of the monadic computation f return identical values
a with poststates t1, t2 related by postrelation R', or else they both return the
same error e.
For the analysis it suffices to consider a fixed set of relations
R_m = λs1.λs2.bisim i s1 s2 ∧ mode s1 = m ∧ mode s2 = m
or R_(n,m) = R_n ∪ R_m.
Figure 4 shows the relational logic inference rules. The inference system is
incomplete, but sufficient for our purpose. A relation R_m is preserved by errorT
and constT (rules constTR and errorTR), and if a computation preserves one
of the R_m relations then that computation can be used in a conditional or a for
loop as well (condTR, conR and forTR). The rule widenR and absR are used to
weaken the postrelation and reason about lambda computations, respectively.
The rule seqTR states that the postrelation of f =nav f ′ is the union of the
errorTI
INV〈errorT a, Q, P〉 constTI
refl P
INV〈constT c, Q, P〉
condTI
refl P INV〈f, Q, P〉
INV〈condT e f, Q, P〉 forTI
refl P trans P INV〈f, Q, P〉
INV〈forTe l h f, Q, P〉
conRI
INV〈f, Q, P〉 INV〈f ′, Q, P〉
INV〈if ψ then f else f ′, Q, P〉
absI
∀y.INV〈f y, Q, P〉
INV〈λy.f, Q, P〉 seqTI
INV〈f, Q, P〉 INV〈f ′, Q, P〉 trans P
INV〈f =e f ′, Q, P〉
parTI
INV〈f, Q, P〉 INV〈f ′, Q, P〉 trans P
INV〈f |||ef ′, Q, P〉
Fig. 5. Invariant inference rules
postrelations of f and f ′, provided that either f preserves R_n or f ′ preserves
R_k. If there is an access violation after f , the computation stops and R_n must
hold. Otherwise, f ′ will execute and R_k must hold. Thus, the postrelation is
the union of R_n and R_k.
Theorem 6. All assertions {f : R → R′} derivable according to the inference
rules in Figure 4 are valid.
Non-exfiltration Similar to the non-infiltration proof, the proof of non-exfiltration
uses a sound but incomplete inference system, this time concerning computation
invariants of the following shape:
INV〈f, Q, P〉 = ∀s, t. Q s ∧ f s = ValueState a t =⇒ P s t ∧ Q t .
That is, if Q holds of the prestate then P holds of the prestate-poststate pair,
and Q of the poststate. We use a simple collection of inference rules to prove
Q and P , shown in Figure 5. In this figure, refl P and trans P respectively
state that P is reflexive and transitive. For non-exfiltration we need to prove that
unmodified i is satisfied during the execution of each instruction both when
it ends in user mode and when switching to privileged mode. A prerequisite for
this is that the MMU is configured correctly during computation. To prove the
non-exfiltration property, we check INV〈next, mmu_setup i, unmodified i 〉.
Theorem 7. All assertions INV〈f,Q,P〉 derivable according to the inference
rules in Figure 5 are valid.
Privileged Constraints The final goal is to prove that next establishes the rela-
tion priv_const, a conjunction of primitive constraints P. Since the primitive
constraints do not always hold during computations in privileged mode, the in-
ference rules of Figure 5 are generally not able to prove this property. To make
verification tractable, we prove primitive constraints locally at the point in the
monadic computation where it is established and then use a set of inference
rules to infer its correctness for the entire computation. We illustrate the proof
take_svc_exception = IT_advance =nav
(λ u.(read_reg 15w |||nav exc_vector_base |||nav read_cpsr |||nav
read_scr |||nav read_sctlr )=nav
(λ(pc,ExcVectorBase,cr,scr,sctlr).
(condT (cr.M = 0b10110w) (write_scr (scr with NS := F)) |||nav
write_cpsr (cr with M := 0b10011w)) =nav
(λ (u1,u2). (write_spsr cr |||nav
write_reg 14w (if cr.T then pc - 2w else pc - 4w) |||nav
(read_cpsr =nav
(λ cr'.write_cpsr (cr' with
<| I := T; IT := 0b00000000w;J := F;
T := sctlr.TE; E := sctlr.EE |>))) |||nav
branch_to (ExcVectorBase + 8w)) =nav unit4)))
Fig. 6. The HOL4 code for switching to svc mode [4]
using an example. In the ARM model, all computations which lead to a privi-
leged mode m end by a computation called take_m_exception. Figure 6 shows
the function take_svc_exception for switching to supervisor mode. Let this
computation start in state s1 and end in state sn. Consider the primitive con-
straint Ppsr stating that SPSR_svc of the final state sn must be equal to CPSR
of the initial state s1. Let t and t′, respectively be the initial state and final
state of write_spsr cr and m be the mode of t′. The computation write_spsr
cr writes the value of free variable cr into SPSR_m and establishes the property
P′psr
def
= t′.psrs(SPSR_m) = cr. We call write_spsr cr a P′psr-establisher. A
computation g is P-establisher, if independently of its input state, P holds in its
output state, i.e.
P−establ(g) = ∀s, a, t. g s = ValueState a t ∧ nav t =⇒ P t
We can prove that the block starting from write_spsr cr establishes P′psr as
well, because the rest of the computations of this block does not modify this prop-
erty. Then we can prove that the free variable cr takes the value s1.psrs(CPSR),
and m is bound to svc. Thus, sn.psrs(SPSR_svc) = s1.psrs(CPSR) holds for the
computation block from write_spsr cr. As this block is a Ppsr-establisher, we
conclude that the computations before write_spsr do not influence the estab-
lished property and Ppsr is satisfied by take_svc_exception.
Figure 7 shows the P-establisher inference rules. These rules along with the
inference rules of Figure 5 are used to prove the privileged constraints. The rule
seqTS1 states that if the monadic computation f is a P-establisher and P is an
invariant of f ′, then the sequential composition f =nav f ′ is P-establisher. The
rule seqTS2 describes that if the monadic computation f is a P-establisher, then
f ′ =nav f is also P-establisher. Similar rules are defined for the |||nav operator.
Theorem 8. All assertions P-establ(f) derivable according to the inference
rules in Figure 7 are valid.
seqTS1
P−establ(f) INV〈f ′, P,>〉
P−establ(f =nav f ′)
seqTS2
P−establ(f)
P−establ(f ′ =nav f)
parTS1
P−establ(f) INV〈f ′, P,>〉
P−establ(f |||nav f ′)
parTS2
P−establ(f)




Fig. 7. Privileged constraints inference rules
6 Implementation and Evaluation
Implementation We use the HOL4 theorem prover to verify our properties. The
central assets of our work are available from [5]. We have developed a tool, ARM-
prover, to automate the verification process based on the proof systems in Fig. 4
and 5. To avoid having to explore the instruction set more than once the prover
actually combines the theorems 1, 2 and 3 into one.
The proof systems do not provide rules for case and let statements. These
are easily handled using standard HOL4 simplification. Other monadic expres-
sions are refined using the inference rules in Fig. 4 and 5 in a top down fashion.
The proofs for write primitives as well as register and memory accesses in user
mode are done manually, but the tool can handle some of the read computa-
tions directly, allowing to prove a large share of the workload automatically.
A particular difficulty concerns binding. When a binding expression f1=nav
f2 is decomposed the return value of f1 becomes unbound in f2. To handle this
we simplify computations by embedding more information before calling the
prover, using some auxiliary lemmas. For example, the following formula states
that cpsr in computation H following read_cpsr can be substituted by the CPSR
in prestate s with mode m.
(mode s = m) ⇒ (read_cpsr =nav (λcpsr. H(cpsr))) s =
(read_cpsr =nav (λcpsr. H(s.psrs(CPSR) with M:=m))) s
For the case that an instruction leads to a privileged mode, the last execution
phase of the instruction, called switching phase, is in privileged mode. However,
the privileged constraints first have to be established over the course of several
steps and do not hold from the beginning. Since we can not use the ARM-prover
tool to prove them automatically, we prove the privileged constraints for the
switching phase manually.
Evaluation The Cambridge model of ARM is 9 kLOC. In addition to the ARM
model, we rely mainly on the relatively small inference kernel of the HOL4
theorem prover, our MMU extension (about 180 lines of definitions) and the
formulation of the discussed properties (about 290 lines). The entire proof script
has a length of about 13 kLOC and needs roughly an hour to run on an Intel(R)
Xeon(R) X3470 core. We invested about one person year of effort into this work.
7 Related Work
Several recent works address kernel verification. Some target information flow
properties [7,12,15,18], based on variants of noninterference [11]. Other work es-
tablishes a refinement relation between kernel code, in some representation, and
an abstract specification. For the seL4 microkernel this was first performed for
its C implementation [13] and is now extended to binary level [20]. As is the
case with most refinement/simulation-based approaches, this work does not ad-
dress information flow. In recent work on seL4 verification, Murray et al. [14,15]
present an unwinding-style characterization of intransitive noninterference. They
introduce a proof calculus on nondeterministic state monads that is similar to
that of this work. Their assertions are more general, however our proof rules
cover several monadic operators and statements. In addition, we introduce rules
to prove properties about executions that relate the final state of a computation
to its initial state.
Alkassar et al. [6] describe the emulation of a simplified MIPS machine in C.
The emulator allows the use of VCC to automatically check that every reachable
state of a guest on a hypervisor is also reachable when the guest is running on a
completely isolated machine. The C emulator has been adopted to verify parts of
the hypervisor that mix C and assembly [17], and allows unknown user processes
to be considered. Information flow properties are not considered, however.
Wilding et al. [21] formally proved exfiltration, infiltration and mediation
theorems for the partitioning system of the AAMP7G microprocessor in ACL2.
The hardware architecture differs from the one of ARM in several points, such
as that there are no user-visible registers or that AAMP7G itself functions as
a separation kernel. Proofs were performed using abstraction/refinement tech-
niques and address kernel microcode. The verification led to a MILS certificate
on Evaluation Assurance Level 7.
The ARMor system [22] sandboxes applications on ARM and provides for-
mal verification of memory safety and control flow integrity, using the Cam-
bridge HOL4 ARM model. Its software fault isolation does not use hardware
features such as an MMU, but uses instead rewriting and subsequent verifica-
tion of the compiled programs. This implies performance overhead, limitations
on supported programs and verification processes in the extend of hours for
each program. Furthermore, ARMor only establishes memory write protection;
neither confidentiality nor protection of privileged registers is addressed.
Most works on kernel verification address handler code only and do not con-
sider user mode execution. In a few cases [6,19] user mode execution is consid-
ered, but without justification in terms of concrete processor access modalities.
The main contribution of our work, over and beyond the above works, is that we
attempt to justify the critical assumptions on processor level information flow
in user mode execution through analysis at the level of a formalized ISA model.
Heitmeyer et al. [12] introduce non-exfiltration, non-infiltration, kernel in-
tegrity and data/control separation properties to verify a separation kernel. Since
we focus on user-mode execution, those properties apply only partially here. Our
non-infiltration property is the same as in [12], but the non-exfiltration property
in our work covers both their kernel integrity and non-exfiltration.
8 Conclusion
We introduced and proved several security properties including a non-exfiltration,
a non-infiltration and a safe switching property for user mode executions on the
ARM architecture, using the Cambridge HOL4 ISA model. A logical framework
based on (relational) Hoare logic has been developed for the analysis, supported
by a tool, ARM-prover, which helps automate the proof. The ARM-prover can
be used to prove general invariants about the ARM model (i.e., statements that
need to hold at each execution point). We are planning to continue the devel-
opment of the ARM-prover to improve automation further and cater for more
general proof tasks.
Our results concerning register contents are generally valid and with small
adaptations applicable in isolation verification of other hypervisors, separation
kernels, and operating systems. Statements on memory safety depend on our spe-
cific setup. A reformulation that is independent of concrete MMU configurations
should require a minor effort and is planned for future work.
The HOL4 model of ARM supports a partial coprocessor model. We made the
assumption that the access to coprocessors via dedicated instructions is always
denied in user mode. To have a more precise analysis and cover all possible side
channels, a more comprehensive model of the available coprocessors involving
all registers, the coprocessors' behavior and an acceptance/rejection-mechanism
for register reads and writes that follows the specification is required. During
context switches kernels need to mediate coprocessor registers user-accessible by
dedicated coprocessor instructions. All other coprocessor registers are guaran-
teed to be non-modifiable in user mode. However, kernels must not introduce
information flow from non-active processes to the coprocessor registers that are
part of the present ARMmodel, since those might influence user mode execution.
Instructions that are underspecified (unpredictable) in the ARM Architec-
ture Reference Manual (ARMARM) are problematic. The ARM specification
states that unpredictable behavior must not perform any function that cannot
be performed at the current or lower level of privilege using instructions that are
not unpredictable[3]. In one interpretation of this statement, theorems 2, 3 and
4 are valid on unpredictable instructions as well. In general, this is not true for
non-infiltration. Yet, ARMARM requires further that unpredictable behavior
must not represent security holes [2]. This formulation is very vague. However,
we make the assumption that non-infiltration is preserved. In fact, we argue
that the security properties we have presented provide manufacturers of ARM
processors with a precise description of secure behavior for unpredictable cases.
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